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The words of 17th century philosopher John Locke 
provide an appropriate starting point for a discussion on the 
art of persuasion: 
 
If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that 
all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the 
artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath 
invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, 
move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment . . . 
and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may 
render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are 
certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or 
instruct, wholly to be avoided . . . (Simons, 99). 
 
The art of persuasion neither demands nor receives favor-
able attention from the general public today (Simons, 101). It 
receives little better, at times, from those scholars who study 
rhetoric (Simons, 114). Persuasion is usually associated with 
purely pejorative terms: propaganda, indoctrination and 
brainwashing. The practice of persuasion is in the hands of 
Madison Avenue and used car dealers. Persuasion is what 
people use when the “truth” is unavailable or contrary to their 
position (Simons, 1986). Opposed to persuasion, in this admit-
tedly simple dialectic, is argumentation. Persuasion is 
emotional; argumentation is logical. Persuasion appeals to the 
base motives of people; argumentation appeals to reason. 
While this is a simple breakdown of two complex acts, it is 
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also the manner in which persuasion and argumentation are 
generally viewed by the public, and is also too often the 
manner in which these communicative approaches are taught. 
This is also a misguided and inappropriate dichotomy. It is 
my contention that, for discourse aimed at securing convic-
tion, there is no useful distinction between argumentation 
and persuasion. Discourse which aims at influencing the 
actions or attitudes of others is and should be considered 
argumentation and persuasion. To distinguish between 
persuasion and argumentation as differing approaches to 
influencing actions and/or attitudes is to continue to divide 
emotional appeals from logical proofs. 
The purpose of this essay is three-fold. First, I will 
summarize the history and development of persuasion and 
rhetoric in the classical and renaissance world, demonstrating 
the manner in which argumentation, or conviction by means 
of logical proof, and persuasion, or conviction by means of a 
unified appeal to emotions and reasons became separated. 
Second, I will look at the manner in which persuasion and 
argumentation are presented educationally today by analyz-
ing four of the most popular public speaking texts. Finally, I 
will argue that there is a more effective method for teaching 
the combined principles of argumentation and persuasion, as 
can be seen in the works of Karl Wallace, Walter Fisher and 
Douglas Hesse, and as seen in the argumentation texts of 
Barbara Warnick and Edward Inch and also Josina Makau. 
There are three additional objectives for this research. 
First, to convince instructors of the introductory communica-
tion course and authors of texts for the introductory course, 
that the dichotomy between persuasion and argumentation 
has a misinterpreted historical background. Secondly, that 
instructing our students that conviction by appeals to emotion 
and conviction by logical proofs are two separate processes is 
fallacious. Finally, I wish to show that presentation of the 
principles of argumentation and persuasion, “rhetorical 
argumentation” (Warnick and Inch, 1989), based on the 
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principle of “good reasons” is necessary in order to provide our 
students with the ability to effectively and ethically use and 
critique communication in the modern world. 
I define persuasion as it was defined by Aristotle and 
refined by Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian in the classical 
world; that is, as conviction through the use of both emotional 
appeals and appeals to reason. The inclusion of reason is a 
necessary element of persuasion. When I use the term 
“argumentation,” I am defining it as conviction through the 
use of appeals solely to reason. Though this once again seems 
a too simplistic analysis of two complex processes, I intend to 
show that the manner in which persuasion and argumenta-
tion have been presented pedagogically leads to the dichotomy 
of argumentation as logic and persuasion as emotion, and that 
this dichotomy in turn offers a skewed view of the role of 
discourse in securing conviction. This distinction is seen easily 
in Fisher’s 1987 discussion of the dichotomy between logos 
and mythos. Logos, in Fisher’s terminology, corresponds to the 
definition of argumentation as conviction solely by appeals to 
reason. Logos, then, is the backbone of the “rational-world 
paradigm” (61-73). Mythos, then, corresponds to the combina-
tion of appeals to reason and appeals to emotion; or, in other 
words, persuasion as I have defined it. It is “rhetorical argu-
mentation” (Warnick and Inch, 1989), argumentation that 
takes into consideration the notion that human beings are 
more than analyzers of fact and evidence, that they take 
emotional appeals and ethical credibility into consideration 
when they reason. 
In the classical world which gave birth to rhetoric, there 
were three major approaches (Clark, 1957): The moral philo-
sophical view of Plato; the technical philosophical view of 
Aristotle; and the practical view of Isocrates, Cicero and 
Quintilian. (In these three views it is possible to see the 
coming split between the logical and “truthful” use of rhetoric 
and the practical, illogical and deceitful use of persuasion.) 
Plato emphasized absolute truth, a truth that was achievable 
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to exceptional men through the strenuous practice of dialectic. 
Rhetoric, for Plato, was at first a pale and unworthy imitation 
of the dialectic, but was later seen as of some possible use to 
the honorable man (Plato, 1987 & 1988). Aristotle took a 
somewhat different view of rhetoric. Instead of disputing the 
use of rhetoric or even the existence of an art of rhetoric, he 
classified it. Aristotle advanced and expanded upon the use of 
rhetoric proposed by Plato in Phaedrus. To Aristotle, rhetoric 
should be used to expound upon the truth, because even 
though what is “true” and “just” are naturally more agreeable 
to a listener than their opposites, they can always benefit 
from a little help (Aristotle, 11). 
Aristotle advanced Plato’s theory of rhetoric, but it was 
still a theory. It took Isocrates to take theory and make it a 
practice. (In discussing Isocrates, along with Plato and 
Aristotle, it is important to remember that a handbook of 
rhetoric has been developed prior to these thinkers: Corax of 
Sicily is credited with that invention.) In his many writings on 
the subject of rhetoric, or what he called the “art of discourse” 
(Clark, 52), Isocrates took rhetoric into the worlds of politics 
and literature, into the world of everyday people. He taught 
the most famous orators, historians, writers and critics of his 
day — he showed the practical use of persuasion as well as 
the need to be wary of the possible abuses of this power. As 
Clark puts it: 
 
In Greece in the fourth century B.C. there was a three-
cornered quarrel among the leading teachers concerning 
what it takes to make a successful speaker. From this quar-
rel Isocrates . . . came out triumphant. More than any other 
Greek rhetorician he left his stamp on subsequent Greek 
and Roman educational theory and practice (5-6). 
 
One area where Isocrates and his view of rhetoric has a 
major influence was in the early Roman rhetoricians, most 
notably Cicero. Cicero, in his publications De Oratore and 
Partitiones Oratoriae, melds the classification of rhetoric that 
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Aristotle accomplished with the method of educating the 
orator that Isocrates proposed. Partitiones Oratoriae, in 
particular, reads like a summary of Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric. 
In De Oratore, Cicero provides a concise summary of the tow 
major divisions of rhetoric: The Platonic-Aristotelian view 
propounded by the character of Crassus and the more practi-
cal (albeit watered-down) view of Isocrates as embodied in the 
character of Antonius. Cicero then argues for the use of 
philosophy (Plato) by the trained rhetorician (Isocrates) to 
help aim humanity toward happiness (Aristotle). 
It is in this quick and brief summary of classical rhetorical 
development that we see the beginnings of a split in rhetoric, 
the split between logic and emotion, between argumentation 
and persuasion, a split that unfortunately still exists. An 
exploration of this split begins with a closer (but still brief) 
look at Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric, continues with a look at the 
split widening in Cicero’s De Oratore, and concludes by 
examining the current nature of this split today. 
The split between logic and emotion begins with Aristotle; 
not through any apparent intention on his part, but simply 
because of his tendency to classify all areas of argument. 
Aristotle popularized the division of rhetorical proof into three 
types: Logos, Ethos, and Pathos. There was no problem with 
that, since a close reading of Aristotle reveals the need to 
combine all three elements in order to construct an effective 
argument (Grimaldi, 1952; Fortenbaugh, 1970; and Rowland 
and Womack, 1985). The problem comes through later 
misreadings of Aristotle’s theory, misreadings that separate, 
rather than classify, emotional appeals (pathos and ethos) and 
logical appeals (logos). 
This separation of emotion and logic is seen in the writ-
ings of Hermagoras, the first major teacher and rhetorical 
theorist after Isocrates (Kennedy, 303-321). Hermagoras 
neglected the use of either ethical or emotional appeals as 
part of his theory of rhetoric. Though rhetoric was still aimed 
at persuading, the persuasion was to take place simply by 
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using logical argument, by informing the audience. This sepa-
ration of emotion and logic continued in this rhetorical era 
(falling between Isocrates and Cicero, circa late third to early 
first century B.C.). Theoreticians such as Theophrastus and 
Demetrius (Kennedy, 273-290; Grube, 1959) took rhetoric and 
persuasion to the other side of the division by concentrating 
their writings and teachings on style, on methods of appealing 
to the audience through technique rather than through the 
truth of the logical arguments. The schism between logic and 
emotion was widening. 
In the first century B.C., the Romans attempted to close 
the gap between logic and emotion. Cicero's De Oratore pro-
vided, in the persons of both Antonius and Crassus, a view of 
rhetoric encompassing both logic and emotion. Though 
differing in how much outside learning an orator must 
possess (Antonius believed a quick dip in a shallow pool of 
outside knowledge would suffice, while Crassus held that the 
true orator would be more akin to the philosopher-orator that 
Plato idealized, one who remained in the sea of learning), 
both Antonius and Crassus realized the need to interweave 
emotion and logic. As Antonius put it: 
 
. . . for purposes of persuasion the art of speaking relies 
wholly upon three things: the proof of our allegations, the 
winning of our hearer’s favour, and the rousing of their feel-
ings to whatever impulse our case may require (Cicero, 
Book II of De Oratore, 281). 
 
Antonius used persuasion to mean both logical proofs and 
emotional appeals. More importantly, he went on to call for 
the use of emotional appeals within the logical proofs them-
selves. 
 
And because . . . there are three methods of bringing people 
to hold our opinion, instruction or persuasion or appeal to 
their emotions, one of these three methods we must openly 
display . . . whereas the two remaining methods should be 
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interfused throughout the whole of the structure of our 
speeches like the blood in our bodies (435). 
 
Following Cicero, Quintilian also argued for the effective 
use of persuasion and emotion in oration. Quintilian argued 
more for the use of emotion in specific parts of the speech, the 
exordium and peroratio especially, but he acknowledged the 
need for effective use of emotion in the entire oration. As 
Kennedy wrote in his book, Quintilian, “Emotion should not 
be forgotten in any part of the speech in Quintilian’s view, but 
it figures especially in two parts: The exordium, where the 
emotional factors are first intimated, and the peroration, 
where they are fully developed” (73). 
It is also important to note that the teachings and writ-
ings of Cicero and Quintilian, in addition to emphasizing the 
interdependence of emotion and logic,  also widened the scope 
of rhetoric to include more than just the art of persuasion. 
Rhetoric became the mainstay of the complete liberal arts 
education, and in the work of Cicero and Quintilian, the moral 
nature of rhetoric and the rhetor, as conceived by Isocrates in 
classical Greece, received renewed attention (Golden, 
Berquist and Coleman, 53). The interdependence of emotion 
and logic, and the role of rhetoric as more than just the art of 
persuasion, remained the province of rhetoric from the time of 
Quintilian through the Middle Ages and up to the time of 
seventeenth century. Golden, Berquist and Coleman state, 
 
It seems evident that despite innovations which 
occasionally altered its scope or emphasis, rhetoric at the 
close of the sixteenth century was still primarily an integral 
part of an old anc cherished system dating back to Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian (53). 
 
In the early seventeenth century, rhetoric began a renais-
sance of its own, a renaissance that carried and reached its 
zenith in the eighteenth century with the writings and 
teachings of George Campbell and Richard Whately. Combin-
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ing the classical tradition from Plato to Cicero with the new 
thinking of Locke and others, most notably the idea of “faculty 
psychology” (Campbell, 93), Campbell proposed a four-step 
approach to persuasion. He wrote, a message must first be 
understood (faculty of understanding), then be attended to 
and remembered (faculty of imagination), and finally felt 
(faculty of passion) in order to move the will. In proposing the 
need for the passions to be excited in order to persuade 
effectively, Campbell did not state that the passions were 
more important than reason, which was the mover of the will. 
Instead, the passions “are her [reason] handmaids, by whose 
ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and 
procure it there a favourable reception” (101). 
Campbell emphasized the important of emotion, of 
emotional appeals in the process of persuasion. He empha-
sized again the interdependency of logical appeals (reason) 
and emotional appeals (passions). But what was also seen in 
the writings of Campbell was a hierarchy. The movement of 
the will was accomplished with the use of emotional appeals 
as servants to reason. The split made possible by Aristotle’s 
classification of Logos, Ethos, and Pathos remained. As can be 
seen by John Locke’s essay above, even when the study of 
rhetoric was once again popular, the emotional appeal of 
rhetoric was downplayed in favor of the logical certainty of 
argument. 
The interweaving of emotion and logic that Aristotle 
proposed can be seen in Campbell’s four-step method of 
conviction. It is also possible to see, in the emergence of 
rationalism that also occurred in the eighteenth century, a 
new eminence for reason at the expense of emotion. Locke’s 
comments show some of this distrust of emotion. Although 
Locke was aware of the need for emotional appeals to buttress 
rational appeals, he was wary of them. Emotional appeals, 
Locke believed, created what he called “uneasiness” in people, 
and led people to change their views in order to rid them-
selves of their uneasiness. (The relationship between Locke’s 
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idea of “uneasiness” and the modern psychological theory of 
cognitive dissonance is readily apparent.) The very term that 
Locke used to describe the effect of emotion on people tells 
much about his opinion toward emotional appeal (Golden, 
Berquist and Coleman, 84). 
This historical review of the development of rhetorical 
theory, of the role of both emotion and logic in discourse 
designed to convince, shows that in the original rhetorical 
theory of Aristotle, as adopted and adapted by Cicero and 
Quintilian, the interdependence of emotion and logic to secure 
conviction was both acknowledged and emphasized. Camp-
bell’s four-step process for conviction, while still acknowledg-
ing the role of emotion in conviction, helped pave the way for 
the further separation of logic and emotion. What is the status 
of persuasion today? How is it being taught and presented, at 
least in the introductory communications classes, classes 
beyond which many of our students never advance? An 
analysis of four of the more popular introductory public 
speaking texts can help answer the above question. The texts 
to be examined are Public Speaking (Osborn and Osborn, 
1988); The Art of Public Speaking (Lucas, 1983); The 
Challenge of Effective Speaking (Verderber, 1982); and 
Principles of Speech Communication (Gronbeck, Ehninger 
and Monroe, 1988). 
In the textbook Public Speaking by Osborn and Osborn, 
one chapter is devoted to persuasive speaking. A look at the 
four major approaches to speech design advocated by the text 
shows that the division between logic and emotion remains 
prevalent. The first design offered for a persuasive speech is 
the problem-solution design. As the text has it, “The problem-
solution design first convinces listeners that they have a prob-
lem, then shows them how to deal with it” (359). The speaker 
is given the task of proving the problem exists and then prov-
ing that his or her solution will solve the problem, There is no 
mention of the need for any appeals to emotion, or of any use 
of emotion whatsoever. (There are obvious reasons for the 
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popularity of the problem-solution design. It is far easier to 
teach students how to use evidence to state and support a 
problem, and then simply solve the problem, than to try to 
teach them how to use the language to do so persuasively as 
well.) It may be argued that specific mention of the role of 
emotion is not mentioned because it is assumed that 
emotional appeals will play a part in any successful presenta-
tion. That is precisely the problem. The lack of a specific 
reminder that emotion does and should play a role leads to an 
exclusion of emotion, with a “successful” speech being one 
that demonstrates the existence of a problem through 
evidence, and then shows deductively how the solution solves 
the problem. The problem, of course, is that simply showing 
your solution works is no guarantee that it will be adopted by 
your audience. 
A second approach, design by analogy, allows for emotion 
in attempting to relate the speaker’s proposal with an already 
popular proposal, but it does not call for the use of any type of 
emotional appeals to the audience within the argument. A 
third approach, the motivated sequence, does call for the use 
of emotional appeals, but limits the use of appeals to the first 
step, “Arousing attention,” and the fifth and last step, “Calling 
for action.” The fourth approach, “Refutative design,” also 
calls for more of a logical approach, instructing the speaker to 
attack the opposition by pointing out inconsistencies in the 
argument. With the exception of the motivated sequence 
approach, these approaches ignore or limit the use of emotion 
in persuasion. They call instead for logical, argumentative 
approaches to persuasion. 
The section on persuasive speaking in the Lucas text is 
quite similar to the section in the Osborn and Osborn text. 
The section on speaking to persuade divides persuasive 
speaking into questions of fact, value and policy, addresses 
the need for audience adaptation in persuasive speaking, and 
presents techniques for composing the persuasive speech, 
including the use of evidence and reasoning, and appeals to 
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emotion. As was seen in the Osborn and Osborn text, though 
the use of emotional appeals in persuasion is called for, the 
interdependence of emotion and logic, the necessity for 
emotion in all persuasive arguments, even those based on 
reason, is not stressed. 
Principles of Speech Communication (Gronbeck, Ehninger 
and Monroe) does a much more effective job of showing the 
interdependence of emotion and reason in the art of persua-
sion, mainly through its detailed presentation of the moti-
vated sequence of persuasion, the need for appealing to the 
motives of the audience. Gronbeck et al. write of the use of 
motivational appeals that “speakers can use to arouse in their 
listeners a particular feeling, emotion or desire in an attempt 
to stimulate one or more of the primary motive needs” (1984, 
265). The motivated sequence design of persuasion goes a long 
way toward the inclusion of emotion in a persuasive argu-
ment. In some instances, it goes a bit too far in that the moti-
vated sequence design, while allowing for the inclusion of 
reason in its design, places more emphasis on motive, on what 
could be termed the psychological basis of persuasion. 
As in the two previous texts, this text provides a separate 
section on argumentation, or on speaking that is designed to 
convince more on logical means than on appeals to emotion. 
“Arguers commit themselves to rationality, to a willingness to 
proceed logically” (1984, 267). This is where the problems lie. 
A separate section on argumentation teaches students that 
there is a fundamental difference between discourse that 
persuades and discourse that attains conviction by means of 
logical proof. 
The Verderber text, similar to the Lucas and Osborn and 
Osborn text, devotes a special section to persuasion and 
persuasive speaking. And like those two, it repeats the call for 
logical (arguments) and emotional appeals. Verderber does, 
however, see the two types of appeals as interdependent: 
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I like to look at logic and emotion as inseparable elements 
within an argument. Thus, we should not look for some 
additional material that will arouse fear or pity or joy or 
anger or guilt or love — we should look for a good, logical, 
supportable argument that will, if properly phrased 
(author’s italics), arouse rear or pity or joy or anger or guilt 
or love (249). 
 
These four approaches to the presentation of persuasion 
in the basic communication course, with the exception of the 
Verderber text, present a conventional view of the dichotomy 
between persuasion and argumentation. While none of the 
texts forbid the mixture of these two approaches to discourse, 
simply by providing for separate sections on the two leads 
students — and teachers — to the conclusion that there is a 
fundamental difference between argumentation and persua-
sion. So just what is the problem with promoting a logical 
approach to persuasion? Of ignoring the emotional aspect? As 
can be seen in this gloss of the public speaking texts, one of 
the major problems lies in the logical or quasi-logical format 
or argumentation, wherein the process determines the success 
of the argument. If a speaker presents a logically sound 
argument, she or he has done her or his job. This emphasis on 
logical form obscures the content and the context. Persuasion, 
therefore, is left with the job of using the content and the 
context to secure the conviction of the audience, not just its 
appreciation of a logically well-constructed argument. 
Cicero, speaking through the persona of Antonius, 
described another problem: 
 
Now nothing in oratory . . . is more important than to win 
for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the 
latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling 
a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgment or 
deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or 
love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or 
illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or 
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authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or 
statute (325). 
 
Simons argued in the same vein, calling persuasive argu-
ments, while not entirely rational, at least “extra-logical.” As 
he states: 
 
According to this view, prototypical persuaders such as 
salespeople and politicians offer facts and reasons to their 
audience, but acceptance of their arguments by audiences 
always rests on something more than, or other than, the 
evidence of the logical arguments they present (102, 
author’s italics). 
 
That is again where the problem lies in our pedagogical 
presentation of persuasion and argumentation as different 
processes of discourse. By stressing the logical development or 
arguments, the emotional acceptance of thee arguments is left 
untouched. Even though the introductory texts examined 
allow for and even encourage the interdependence of emotion 
and logic, they still allow for and encourage the split between 
persuasion and argumentation, between convincing by the 
means of appeals or emotion leading conviction by reason 
(persuasion) and convincing by logical arguments (argumen-
tation). 
As was seen in looking at Osborn and Osborn’s Public 
Speaking, argumentation at the introductory level is still 
being taught as almost a purely logical matter. Students are 
being told that if they simply prove logically that a problem 
exists and that their solution is the best one to meet their 
defined problem, they have met the criteria for success. How 
do we answer them when their audience fails to respond to 
their logical presentation but instead supports a less well-
thought out but more emotionally-wrought argument? 
Additionally, by instructing students in argumentation as 
logic, we fail to equip these students with the ability to 
critique persuasive messages effectively. We fail to deal with 
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issue such as the ethical use of emotion in arguments if we 
simply teach students to use logical arguments solely. We end 
up perpetuating what Walter Fisher described as a “rational 
world paradigm” (Fisher, 1987, 143-57). 
Instead of continuing the split between persuasion and 
argumentation, between conviction including emotion and 
conviction based solely on logic (a form of conviction that may 
exist but has yet to be found, since people are human and not 
machines), there is a need for a synthesis, an understanding 
that even so-called “logical” conviction uses emotional appeals 
of some sort. This synthesis can be reached by applying the 
ideas of Wallace (1963) and Fisher (1978) and the concept of 
“good reasons,” and the work of Douglas Hesse (1989). A 
modern pedagogical approach that begins to encompass this 
plan can be seen in the Warnick and Inch text and their 
notion of “rhetorical argumentation” (1989). 
In his seminal article in 1963, “The Substance of Rhetoric: 
Good Reasons,” Wallace noted first the problem which 
remains in our public speaking texts: We tell student how to 
construct effective speeches, but we do not deal with the 
substance of these speeches. As Wallace stated: “Most of our 
textbooks pay little attention to what speeches are about; 
rather, their point of view is pedagogical. They concentrate on 
how to make a speech and deliver it” (241). Wallace further 
argued that rhetoric, that speeches, are all, to some degree or 
another, persuasive. “Much discourse and discussion that is 
thought of as didactic is probably persuasive in effect if not in 
intent,” Wallace wrote. “In brief, it would appear that exposi-
tory speaking and writing recognize choices and values that 
differ from those of persuasive discourse principally in that 
they are more remote and less apparent” (242). 
Given that expository discourse contains elements of 
persuasion, the dichotomy between argumentation (argument 
based on fact, on reason) and persuasion (argument based on 
emotional appeals and reason) does not exist. Since intention-
ally informative discourse, discourse based on facts, can be 
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just as persuasive in effect as discourse based on emotional 
appeals and reason, students should be taught to use persua-
sive methods in speaking and to understand the persuasive 
nature of supposedly informative discourse (Kinneavy, 1971). 
Wallace also argued that persuasive discourse, which is for all 
practical purposes all message-transmitting discourse (in the 
sense that even informative discourse has a persuasive 
flavor), is delivered as judgment statements, “statements 
having to do with action, motives, feelings, emotions, atti-
tudes and values” (242). These judgments are responses to 
two fundamental question: “What shall I do or believe? What 
ought I to do?” (242). 
Since message-transmitting discourse, then, is persuasive 
in either intent or effect, Wallace asked rhetoricians to adopt 
the term “good reasons.” Good reasons, in Wallace’s definition, 
are statements offered in support of ought propositions or 
value propositions — what shall I do? and what shall I 
believe? The use of good reasons in discourse would have the 
effect, Wallace continued, of "reminding the speaker, as well 
as [rhetoricians and teachers], that the substance of rhetorical 
proof has to do with values and value-judgments, i.e., with 
what is held to be good (248). Additionally, the use of good 
reasons as the basis for support in discourse would take care 
of the problem of distinctions between logical and emotional 
proof. As Wallace stated: 
 
Any distinctions that modern rhetoric may be trying to 
maintain between logical, ethical, and emotional modes of 
proof would immediately become unreal and useless, except 
for purposes of historical criticism . . . . For the theorist . . . 
of discourse, the disappearance of these weasel concepts, 
logical proof and emotional proof, would permit a descrip-
tion of the materials of practical discourse in terms of two 
broad categories: materials deriving from the specific occa-
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This conception of rhetoric as the search for good reasons 
begins the step toward a theory of persuasion that encom-
passes logic and emotion effectively, that acknowledges the 
role that emotional appeals play in conviction. However, 
Wallace never offers a way to distinguish between good 
reasons and, so to speak, “bad” good reasons, or appeals that 
appear to function as supports to ought statements, but 
instead function as more base appeals. Fisher attempts to 
provide a model for the use of good reasons (1978). 
Fisher first offers a definition of good reasons that goes 
little beyond Wallace’s. Fisher terms a good reason “those 
elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to 
the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be 
considered rhetorical” (376). Fisher takes a step forward when 
he provides an ethical standard for measuring between good 
reasons and “bad” good reasons. A good reason is “good” when 
it is tied to a value that “makes a pragmatic difference in 
one’s life and in one’s community” (383). Fisher, making it 
plain that he opposes the imposition of any hierarchical stan-
dard of values, offers a definition that provides a method for 
evaluating good reasons. In order for this evaluatory scheme 
to function, however, it is necessary to add one word to 
Fisher’s definition. A good reason is one that makes a positive 
pragmatic difference in one’s life and in one’s community. 
(Fisher may have included the idea of a positive difference in 
his use of the word pragmatic.) By positive, I mean a differ-
ence that improves in some manner the quality of life for an 
individual or a community while at the same time not 
decreasing the quality of life for another member of the 
community. Fisher further defined what a “good reason” is 
with a more-developed five-part “Logic of Good Reasons” are 
“Consequence,” “Consistency,” and “Transcendence.” These 
three components provide instructors and students criteria for 
determining the credibility and probably efficacy of a “good 
reason.” 
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What does this conception of good reasons as the 
substance of discourse mean for the teaching of persuasion? 
First, by acknowledging the concept that even so-called 
factual statements are, in effect, persuasive statements, the 
distinction between conviction by persuasion (emotion and 
reason) and conviction by argumentation (reason alone) can 
be discarded. There is no need for separate sections in our 
introductory public speaking textbooks to teach argumenta-
tion skills. Argumentation and persuasion should be 
presented as one and the same thing. Secondly, the concept of 
good reasons requires that we as teachers and as textbook 
writers spend less time talking about the components of 
persuasive discourse (since we have decided that the compo-
nents are good reasons) and more time talking and writing 
about how to discover and use good reasons in discourse 
production, and how to analyze discourse, especially so-called 
factual discourse, in order to ferret out the good reasons in the 
discourse, to discover why the facts are facts. In short, we will 
be required to teach students not just to follow guidelines that 
will enable them to produce discourse, but to question the 
very substance of the “factual” evidence and “emotional” 
appeals. This approach would dissolve the distinction between 
logical appeals, appeals to “fact” (argumentation), and 
emotional appeals (persuasion). It would end the preference 
given to “factual” argument with its insistence on the persua-
sive nature of facts. 
Douglas Hesse (1989) offers a method for this style of 
teaching. Although writing primarily to introduce a method of 
critical reading, Hesse’s method also works well, with adapta-
tion, for teaching students to come up with good reasons for 
their arguments. To adapt Hesse: 
 
1. What shared assumptions allow the audience and the 
speaker to communicate? Why are those assumptions 
shared? 
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2. Imagine a different audience, an audience that would 
have difficulty understanding the discourse. What 
assumptions would that audience share? 
3. What makes us take the discourse seriously? How does it 
attract our attention? Or why do we invite it into our 
attention? 
4. What desires does the discourse fulfill? 
5. Who benefits from attending to this discourse? Why? 
How? 
6. Who would not benefit from this discourse? Why? How? 
7. What is absent from this discourse? (21) 
 
These seven steps would best be put to use in the 
construction and critique of arguments and evidence. Rather 
than simply providing a checklist of criteria for credible 
evidence and reputable sources, this approach requires 
students to acknowledge both the special nature of the subject 
and the audience to which the discourse is aimed. By using 
the above method, or a variation of this method, we require 
our students to think. In creating or evaluating persuasive 
discourse, this method requires students to be aware of the 
audience as both reasonable and emotional actors. It is not 
enough to construct an argument that has equal parts of logi-
cal, ethical and emotional proof; it is not enough to “logically 
prove’ that a problem exists and then offer a solution to the 
problem that “logically solves” it. Instead, students must come 
up with arguments that acknowledge the interdependence of 
logic and emotion and the blurring of the distinction between 
fact and belief. By the same token, requiring our students to 
use this method in producing their discourse will also provide 
them a method for evaluating the discourse of others. Rather 
than accepting as “fact,” evidence presented to bolster an 
argument, students will be allowed and encouraged to ques-
tion the evidence as “fact.” 
Does this require a massive rethinking of teaching 
methodology? No. Does this require all new textbooks? No. 
Modifications of teaching methods to allow for the teaching of 
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critical thinking skills in place of methods that teach students 
to simply fill in the dots to produce discourse will help. Good 
teachers do that already. Emphasis in our introductory public 
speaking textbooks on the inter-relationship of logic and 
emotion and acknowledgement that argumentation and 
persuasion are the same thing will also help. Warnick and 
Inch emphasize, especially in the section on the rhetorical 
perspective of argumentation, the interdependency of logic 
and emotion. They also acknowledge and emphasize the ethi-
cal role of argumentation. Ethical arguments are more than 
simply logically valid arguments. They must also be argu-
ments that enhance the quality of life of the community — 
arguments, in other words, that employ the "good reasons" of 
Wallace and Fisher. Warnick and Inch write: "The humanistic 
standard [of ethics] assumes that if the process of argumen-
tation has certain characteristics [good reasons], the potential 
of all parties for making choices that enhance self-develop-
ment and their quality of life is encouraged" (16). 
Josina Makau, in Reasoning and Communication: 
Thinking Critically About Arguments (1990) also provides 
some interesting pedagogical approaches to teaching rhetori-
cal argumentation. Makau highlights the interdependence of 
logic and emotion in effective argumentation. “Logic is not 
enough for reasoned interaction. Emotions also play an impor-
tant role. Good argumentation involves a balance between 
logic and emotion” (46, author's italics). In illustrating this 
balance between logic and emotion, Makau asks students to 
analyze arguments not merely for their logical structure and 
use of evidence, but also for the values that undergird the 
arguments (206). She uses what she describes as “Family Life 
Issues” (205) to illustrate the interdependence of logic and 
emotion, of fact and value, the need to discover and under-
stand the value premises that support the arguments. In 
completing these activities, students come to see that simply 
constructing a logically coherent argument is not enough — 
values and beliefs must be considered. 
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By upgrading the teaching of persuasion, the teaching of 
practical discourse, by returning to the notion of reasoning 
that has been credited to argumentation, by ending the 
unnecessary distinction between argumentation and persua-
sion, we will return the practice back to its origin, back to 
when rhetoric was the power to persuade and convince and 
improve the condition of humanity. We will return to persua-
sive discourse the ethical quality that will help to rescue it 
from derogation as sophistry and trickery. We will prepare 
students to become the type of people that Isocrates envi-
sioned as products of his rhetorical training. We are, to put it 
simply, teaching people to think critically and act ethically. 
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